Improbable nationalists? Social democracy and national independence in Georgia 1918-1921 by King, Francis
Improbable nationalists? 35
Improbable nationalists? 
Social democracy and national 
independence in Georgia 1918-1921
Francis King
Abstract:
The Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921) had the world’s first ever 
elected social-democratic government. However, despite attempts then and 
later to present it as an exemplar of democratic socialism, the main tasks 
its leaders faced, in the context of post-imperial revolutionary chaos, were 
those of nation-building and consolidation. This necessarily led the state 
into conflict with its neighbours and national minorities, and to adopt a 
series of measures and compromises which both undermined the socialist 
aspects of the regime and fostered nationalism and even chauvinism, against 
the intentions and ideology of its rulers. This in turn weakened the regime, 
facilitating its eventual overthrow by the Red Army.
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On 26 May 1918, Georgia, in Transcaucasia, declared its independence. 
Unlike many other ‘states’ which sprang up like mushrooms on the ter-
ritory of the disintegrating Russian empire, only to collapse again within 
weeks, the Democratic Republic of Georgia (DRG) showed signs of 
viability. It survived innumerable internal and external attempts to over-
throw it from 1918 until February 1921, when it finally succumbed to 
a massive invasion by the Red Army. Remarkably, this small, agrarian, 
economically underdeveloped country was led throughout this period 
by Marxists, social democrats aligned with the Russian Mensheviks, 
who had won – and retained throughout – the support of the greater 
part of the Georgian population. It had the first elected social-democratic 
government anywhere in the world. During this brief period of state 
independence, its social-democratic leaders made significant attempts at 
social, economic and democratic reform – against a background of con-
tinual conflict with their neighbours and their own national minorities, 
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a dislocated and declining economy, and a chaotic and often corrupt 
administration.
The Georgian story reverberated way beyond the Caucasus region, both 
at the time and afterwards. The DRG’s tense relations with Soviet Russia 
reflected and encapsulated the split in the world socialist movement into 
social democrats and communists. Like Soviet Russia, but on a much more 
modest scale, the DRG tried to mobilise and organise support for its cause 
within the international labour movement. Using their wide network of 
contacts in the parties of the former Second International, Georgia’s leaders 
tried to present their case to workers and activists abroad. The country 
became a cause célèbre for European social democracy, receiving visits in 
1920 from various socialist leaders. Karl Kautsky stayed several months 
and sang its praises in Georgia. A Social-Democratic Peasant Republic 
(1921). He stressed the DRG’s ‘democratic’ system, and claimed that ‘in 
comparison with the hell which Soviet Russia represents, Georgia appeared 
as a paradise’.1 The solidarity campaign did not cease with the Red Army 
takeover. Having escaped into exile in France, Georgia’s social-democratic 
leaders continued to press their cause, both in the Labour and Socialist 
International and more widely. 
In contrast, communist authors presented the DRG as internally tyran-
nical and externally obsequious to imperialism. Leon Trotsky’s Between 
Red and White (1922), largely a polemic against Kautsky, set the tone. The 
DRG, Trotsky claimed, was a ‘Menshevik terrorist regime’, which unlike 
Soviet Russia ‘aimed at preserving the institution of private property and the 
alliance with imperialism’.2 Georgia’s workers and peasants had overthrown 
it in a ‘Soviet revolution’, and the Red Army had merely provided fraternal 
assistance.3 In this way, two incompatible narratives around the DRG arose 
and developed from the 1920s onwards. The communist narrative stressed 
the struggles of the local Bolsheviks, and from the 1930s became merged with 
hagiographies of Georgian Bolsheviks like Joseph Stalin, Lavrenti Beria and 
Sergo Ordzhonikidze. In contrast, the social-democratic accounts, greatly 
supplemented by the memoirs of the participants themselves, merged seam-
lessly into an émigré narrative of Georgia’s national struggle for freedom 
and democracy against Muscovite imperialism.
These stories, however, lay largely dormant for decades, until Georgian 
nationalism gained political traction again as the USSR crumbled in the late 
1980s. Since then, the story of those three years of independence, ending with 
Georgia’s forcible reincorporation into the Russian fold, have become part 
of an officially-cultivated national mythology. In this new official version, 
the socialist aspects of the DRG are downplayed against the national ones. 
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Meanwhile, certain authors and scholars, mostly outside Georgia, have 
attempted to rediscover the DRG as a viable democratic socialist alternative 
to the horrors of Soviet rule. Eric Lee’s book The Experiment: Georgia’s 
Forgotten Revolution (2017) is the most recent contribution, and he spells 
out his political message clearly in the book’s peroration: ‘Look at the 
Georgian experiment. That was democratic socialism.’4
Although the democratic socialist ideology of the Georgian leaders played 
an important part in the DRG story, there were also other factors at work. 
The tragedy of the Georgian social democrats was that in 1918, contrary to 
their expectations and ideology, they found themselves leading a national, 
rather than a social revolution. This was not what they had intended. They 
had originally been the least nationalist political force in Georgia. As late as 
July 1918 they had still regarded themselves as an integral part of the Russian 
Social-Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDRP), a thoroughly international-
ist party which was well aware of the destructive and divisive potential of 
nationalism. Yet at the end of May they had already taken the decisive step 
in breaking Georgia away not only from Russia, but also from its immediate 
neighbours in Transcaucasia – Armenia and Azerbaijan. This article exam-
ines how the logic of events pushed Georgia’s social-democratic leadership 
towards a sometimes virulent nationalism, involving conflict with Georgia’s 
neighbours and own minorities. It shows how these nation-building efforts 
shaped, distorted and ultimately did much to derail the democratic and 
social aspects of their revolution.
Before 1917 – Georgian social democracy and national 
consciousness
A democratically-minded national intelligentsia began to develop in 
Georgia from the 1860s, and from the 1890s its younger generation, like 
many in Russia proper, had begun to embrace Marxism on a large scale. 
Although Georgia had little industry and had very few proletarians, 
Marxism offered several things for a small oppressed nation in Georgia’s 
position. Firstly, it was a modernising, European, ideology of progress 
which fitted the westward-looking orientation of the country’s intellectu-
als. Secondly, the democratic demands of social democracy, such as full legal 
and political equality and civil rights for all citizens offered an attractive 
vision of social justice for a small nation within Imperial Russia. Thirdly, 
social democracy proposed a concrete programme of political action for a 
democratic revolution. And fourthly, its perspective of equal rights for all 
nationalities within a democratised Russian state offered a way around the 
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pitfalls of straight ‘national independence’. Georgia’s geographical position 
sandwiched between Ottoman Turkey and Russia, and the complex ethnic 
patchwork of Georgia and the wider Caucasus region, meant that ‘inde-
pendence’ was not an easy option. Like the Jewish workers’ Bund in the 
west of the Russian empire, the social democrats in Georgia saw the success 
of the Russian revolutionary movement as a whole as the best guarantor of 
their own national liberation. Unlike the Bund, though, the Georgian social 
democrats strongly opposed any ethnic particularism within the party, 
which they saw as a recipe for disaster in the Caucasian context.5
The social-democratic circles in Georgia of the late 1890s, led by the 
authoritative Noe Zhordania, linked up with RSDRP not long after its 
formal foundation in 1898. After 1903, when RSDRP split into Bolshevik 
and Menshevik factions, most – but not all – Georgian members took the 
Menshevik side. They rejected the narrow organisational model for the 
party proposed by Lenin, because they saw a potential for a more open 
and inclusive party in Georgia – the anti-colonial, national, dimension 
of their struggle allowed them to mobilise broader strata of the popula-
tion than was possible in Russia. But they were only ‘Mensheviks’ in the 
all-Russia context. In Georgia itself, they pursued their own distinctive 
policies. Unlike most Russian Mensheviks, the Georgians actively involved 
themselves with the burgeoning peasant movement. In 1904, as one of the 
forerunners of the revolutionary wave which engulfed the Russian empire 
in 1905, peasants in the western Georgian district of Guria launched a mass 
uprising under the political guidance of the social democrats, and remained 
in control of the entire district until early 1906.6 Georgia as a whole was an 
active centre of the 1905 revolution – besides the peasant risings there were 
strikes and assassinations, and in September that year the social democrats 
in Tiflis (present-day Tbilisi) organised a coordinated bombing campaign 
against the barracks of the Cossack troops sent to crush the revolution.7 
Despite this, in November 1905 the helpless Imperial authorities in Tiflis 
found themselves obliged to appeal to the social democrats for help. As the 
revolutionary events were reaching their climax, there was a serious threat of 
intercommunal pogroms, and the local administration permitted the social 
democrats to mobilise armed workers in to help keep the peace.8 But as the 
revolution across Russia went down to defeat, an attempt at a general strike 
in Georgia in December 1905 was crushed, and martial law was imposed. 
Nonetheless, the social democrats had firmly established themselves as one 
of the leading political forces in Georgia. In all the elections to the newly-
created State Duma (parliament), no matter how far the Tsarist authorities 
tried to restrict or rig the franchise, there were social democrats elected from 
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Georgia. Two of these deputies, Nikolay Chkheidze and Iraklii Tsereteli, 
were among the most influential Menshevik leaders in Petrograd in 1917.
In Georgia itself between 1905 and 1917, even though the RSDRP as a 
party was illegal, social democrats remained active in education, co-oper-
atives, trade unions, journalism, and local administration. Their Duma 
representatives raised the profile of both Georgia and social democracy on 
the all-Russia level, and provided a legal, public face for social democracy 
which coexisted with the clandestine party organisation. Unlike many other 
Mensheviks in this period, the Georgian social democrats resisted the idea, 
then known as ‘liquidationism’, of dissolving their underground groups.9 
Their organisational strength allowed them to extend their influence more 
widely into Transcaucasia. Although social democracy remained very weak 
among the Muslim (largely Azeri) population while among the Armenians 
the nationalist Dashnaktsutiun party predominated, Tiflis was the multi-eth-
nic administrative centre of the whole region, and the social democrats were 
the only socialist current present among Georgians, Russians, Armenians 
and others. This greater reach put them in a very strong position, even with 
the massive decline in all revolutionary activity in the post-1905 years of 
reaction.
The experience of World War One on the Russo-Turkish front was dif-
ferent from that of Russia’s western front. Russia’s southern armies were 
quite successful, and most of the fighting took place on territory seized early 
on from the Ottomans. At the same time, following the large-scale Turkish 
massacres of Armenians in 1915, few people doubted what a successful 
Ottoman invasion would look like, at least, for the non-Muslim peoples in 
Transcaucasia. This very much shaped the local socialists’ perspectives on 
the war – an ‘internationalist’ abdication from the war may have made sense 
to some Russian Marxists looking across their western front to Germany, 
but on the southern front – for Georgians and particularly for Armenians 
– maintaining the front against the Turks pending a peace agreement was 
literally a matter of life and death.
Revolution breaks out
When the news of the fall of the autocracy reached the Caucasus in early 
March 1917, there was little doubt that the RSDRP would emerge as the 
dominant party, at least in Georgia. Noe Zhordania – then living in hiding 
in Tiflis – was summoned to the palace of the Vice-regent of the Caucasus, 
Grand Duke Nikolay Nikolaevich, to be told that the Grand Duke was relin-
quishing his powers and was confident that the social democrats would be 
Socialist History 54.indd   39 05/02/2019   15:37:40
40 Socialist History 54
able to establish the necessary order.10 The end of tsarism, however, produced 
an explosion of all sorts of political and social activity across the Caucasus. 
In Georgia, as elsewhere on the periphery of the empire, both social and 
national claims were advanced, sometimes simultaneously. Nationalistically-
minded Georgians gravitated to the Georgian Party of Socialist-Federalists 
and the newly-formed National Democratic Party. But these were minority 
parties. The dominance of the RSDRP ensured that developments in Georgia 
were initially broadly in step with the all-Russia movement.
The all-Russia Provisional Government created a Transcaucasus 
Committee (OZAKOM), with local representatives, to replace the Tsarist 
vice-regency, while a network of soviets quickly formed across Georgia and 
other centres in Transcaucasia. The most important was the Tiflis Workers’ 
Soviet, founded in early March on the initiative of the Bolshevik Filipp 
Makharadze, but dominated throughout by Menshevik-oriented social 
democrats and chaired by Noe Zhordania.11 The soldiers garrisoned in 
Tiflis were organised in a separate soviet, dominated at first by the (all-Rus-
sia) Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries (SRs), but the two soviets organised a 
common presidium, again chaired by Zhordania. Although the Tiflis Soviet 
did not formally seek to usurp OZAKOM’s authority, it rapidly proved 
itself to be the most powerful organisation on the ground. The ruthlessness 
with which the dominant social democrats exercised their power locally was 
recalled by Zhordania later in his memoirs.
In the summer of 1917, there began to be mass robberies and other 
serious crimes. In response, the [Soviet] Executive Committee instituted 
courts-martial, and those found guilty were shot. From this time on the 
power of the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies was in fact confirmed, and 
all the highest institutions, for example OZAKOM, the city authorities 
and so on would turn to the Soviet to carry out various decisions. There 
were occasions where these decisions were not carried out, because we 
disagreed with them.12
The Tiflis soviet organisation remained Zhordania’s main power base 
throughout 1917 and for the first part of 1918, from which he guided the 
work of his comrades in state and other institutions, ensuring that his party 
dominated Georgian political life.13
The Bolshevik faction was so weak in Georgia that for the first two 
months after the fall of the Tsar, it attempted to work in common RSDRP 
organisations with the Menshevik-oriented majority, until political diver-
gences made this impossible to continue.14 The relative strength of the two 
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factions was reflected in the elections to the Tiflis City Duma at the end of 
July 1917, where they stood on separate lists: the (Menshevik) social demo-
crats gained 42 per cent of the vote, compared to just under 5.5 per cent for 
the Bolsheviks.15 Bolshevik support was stronger among ethnic Russians 
and certain other national minorities, and in the course of 1917 it grew par-
ticularly significantly among the soldiers of the Caucasus army. 
At this stage, between February and October 1917, the Georgian social 
democrats’ main political horizons were the Russian empire as a whole, 
rather than Transcaucasia or just Georgia. They envisaged national auton-
omy for Georgia within a democratic, parliamentary Russian republic, but 
the essential precondition for this was the transformation of Russia itself. 
The parties which oriented their politics to Georgia alone, such as the 
National Democrats and the Socialist-Federalists, remained much less influ-
ential. Vladimir Voytinsky, a Russian Menshevik propagandist for Georgian 
social democracy, could later claim, without too much exaggeration, that:
In 1917 Georgia was perhaps the only peripheral country where separa-
tist tendencies were unknown. Although imbued with the national spirit, 
its people remained not only fundamentally loyal to the Russian central 
authorities, but were also prepared to make the greatest sacrifices for the 
cause of the Russian revolution.16
In the first months of the revolution, the Mensheviks were the dominant 
force in both all-Russia and Georgian soviet politics. On the question of the 
war, they generally agreed that the front had to be held until a democratic 
peace could be secured. They looked forward to the election of an all-Russia 
Constituent Assembly, which alone would have the right to determine the 
future shape of the Russian empire. Moreover, Mensheviks from Georgia, 
notably Nikolay Chkheidze and Iraklii Tsereteli were playing leading polit-
ical roles in the Petrograd Soviet. From May 1917, Tsereteli also served as a 
minister in the Provisional Government, although at this stage his comrades 
in Tiflis disapproved of socialists joining coalitions with bourgeois parties.17
This relative harmony was, however, short-lived. In the course of 1917, 
a growing gulf developed between the well-organised and well-entrenched 
Georgian social democrats and their rapidly disintegrating comrades in 
Russia. As the political chaos in Petrograd worsened in early autumn 1917, 
the ineptitude and helplessness of the central Menshevik leadership became 
obvious to Zhordania, and he began to take the view that ‘the only way to 
save us is by strengthening local power’.18 The implications of this would 
only gradually become clear.
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Since March 1917, the new authorities at all levels, not least in Georgia, 
had been fully occupied trying to deal with the ever-worsening immedi-
ate problems they faced. Bigger decisions – in particular, land reform – had 
been put off until an all-Russia Constituent Assembly had been elected and 
convened, on the grounds that only such a body would have the authority 
and resources to resolve such questions. The Caucasus Regional Congress 
of Workers’ and Peasants’ Deputies in May 1917, for example, had adopted 
a detailed resolution on the agrarian question which mostly amounted to 
recommendations for the future Constituent Assembly.19 However, by 
the time the assembly elections were eventually held across the Russian 
empire, including Transcaucasia, in November 1917, the political context 
had changed fundamentally. The Provisional Government had already been 
overthrown, Lenin’s Bolsheviks had taken power in Petrograd in the name 
of the soviets, and had immediately issued far-reaching proclamations on 
peace and land reform. The tacit consensus that these questions would be 
the preserve of the Constituent Assembly had been broken. 
After October
It was the October Revolution which set the Georgian social democrats 
on the road to independence. Lenin had proclaimed ‘soviet power’ – but 
‘soviet power’ already existed in Georgia. Zhordania’s party controlled 
the most important soviets, as well as most state institutions on Georgian 
territory, and had no intention of recognising Lenin’s Council of People’s 
Commissars (Sovnarkom) in Petrograd as a legitimate ‘soviet government’. 
Like most non-Bolshevik forces across the empire, Zhordania’s party did 
not at first expect the Sovnarkom to last very long. At a combined meeting 
of the regional and Tiflis soviets on 26 October/8 November to consider 
the events in Petrograd, a Bolshevik motion welcoming the actions of the 
Petrograd Soviet was overwhelmingly defeated, with just 16 votes in favour, 
147 against, and five abstentions.20 A Bolshevik demand at the same meeting 
that all soviets in Georgia be reelected was also rebuffed without difficulty.21 
Following this failure in Tiflis, the Bolsheviks concentrated on organ-
ising and agitating among the soldiers in the garrisons and on the front. 
Meanwhile, in Baku, Azerbaijan, a boycott by other parties left the Baku 
Soviet in the hands of the Bolsheviks and Left Socialist Revolutionaries, led 
by the very capable Bolshevik Stepan Shaumyan.22 The struggle for power 
was far from over, and was about to enter a more violent phase.
The fall of the Russian Provisional Government meant that OZAKOM 
lost its raison d’être. On 15/28 November 1917 the political leaderships 
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in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, none of which recognised Lenin’s 
government, voted to replace OZAKOM with a new Transcaucasian 
Commissariat. This was an unnatural coalition of, among others, Georgian 
social democrats, Armenian nationalist Dashnaks and Azerbaijani Islamic 
reformists from the Musavat party. Its brief was to take care of purely 
regional affairs until the all-Russia Constituent Assembly could convene, 
although one of its first acts went way beyond this remit – on 5/18 December 
1917 it approved an armistice concluded between the Russian and Ottoman 
commands on the southern front.23 In a memoir of the period written in 
1956, the veteran Georgian social democrat Grigol Uratazde argued that 
the creation of the commissariat marked the point when Transcaucasia ‘de 
facto split away from Russia’.24 That was not how Uratadze and his com-
rades presented it at the time – it was their Bolshevik rivals who denounced 
the formation of the commissariat as a ‘plan to separate Transcaucasia from 
Russia’ in cahoots with ‘Armenian, Georgian and Muslim chauvinists’.25
The commissariat, uniting nationalities and political forces with very dif-
ferent perspectives and interests, was inherently unstable, and was largely 
held together by the hegemonic position of the Georgian social democrats.26 
Although they had only two of the twelve commissars on this body, they 
held the two key positions – Evgeniy Gegechkori as chairman and foreign 
affairs commissar, and Akaki Chkhenkeli as internal affairs commissar. 
Chkhenkeli in particular would later use his position in the commissariat to 
advance purely Georgian national interests.
Georgia starts creating national institutions
Days after the formation of the Transcaucasian Commissariat, there was 
a large conference in Tiflis of representatives of political parties, social 
organisations and institutions, and national minorities in Georgia. On 
20 November/3 December 1917, this conference established a National 
Council of Georgia, chaired by Chkhenkeli.27 At first it had no formal insti-
tutional power, but over time, as the social democrats began to rely less on 
class organisations like the soviets, and as Transcaucasian structures faltered 
in 1918, the importance and competence of the National Council expanded.
From the outset, the question of defence was a key priority for the 
Georgian leaders. By the end of 1917 many Russian soldiers on the 
Caucasus front were very receptive to Bolshevik peace slogans, and even 
the more ‘patriotic’ among them had no interest in fighting to defend a 
quasi-independent Transcaucasia against the Ottomans. Attempts to form 
‘national’ regiments of locals towards the end of 1917 also failed: Bolshevik 
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anti-war agitation rapidly rendered these unfit for purpose.28 The armistice 
with Turkey meant that with the fighting apparently over, Russian soldiers 
abandoned the front positions. Discipline had broken down and Tiflis was 
host to large numbers of restive, Bolshevik-inclined soldiers. Many of them 
were from other parts of the empire and were keen to return home, but in 
the meantime they were actively participating in local political struggles. 
At the Second Regional Soldiers’ Soviet Congress in December 1917, they 
passed resolutions calling for ‘soviet power’ and undertaking to obey the 
authorities in Petrograd.29
To secure its position in Georgia, Zhordania’s party needed to disarm 
and remove these soldiers, and create an armed force of its own under its 
firm control. The latter task was entrusted to Valiko Dzhugeli, a young 
and very radical social democrat who had only recently defected from the 
Bolsheviks. On 29 November/12 December, with authorisation from the 
Tiflis Soviet, he led a poorly-armed band to take control of the Tiflis arsenal. 
The soldiers guarding it, disoriented by the fact that this takeover was at the 
behest of the Tiflis Soviet, offered little effective resistance. Along with the 
arsenal, Dzhugeli and his comrades also captured the local Bolshevik leaders 
Nikolay Kuznetsov and Kote Tsintsadze and delivered them to Zhordania, 
who released them.30 With their newly-acquired weapons, Dzhugeli organ-
ised and led the ‘People’s Guard’ – a paramilitary group answerable to the 
Tiflis Soviet and Noe Zhordania personally. This gave the Georgian social 
democrats a serious armed force for internal policing. It could resist and 
disarm Bolshevised soldiers, and deal with other disgruntled elements 
on Georgian territory. As Dzhugeli later boasted at the People’s Guard’s 
second anniversary celebration, ‘the seizure of the arsenal finally protected 
Tiflis against being sacked’ by marauding soldiers.31 The People’s Guard 
was to play a central – and fateful – role in Georgian politics between 1917 
and 1921.
Up to early January 1918, all the state-building efforts in Transcaucasia 
had been conceived as provisional measures, until the all-Russia Constituent 
Assembly could meet and devise new constitutional arrangements for the 
whole empire. This orientation towards the assembly was particularly 
strong in Georgia, given the all-Russia horizons of the dominant social-
democrats at that time. Consequently, the dispersal and abolition of the 
Constituent Assembly on 6/19 January 1918 by Lenin’s government in 
Petrograd destroyed the Georgian social democrats’ political road map. 
The future shape of Russia was more unclear than ever, and although the 
ceasefire with the Ottomans was still holding at this point, the ongoing dis-
integration of the Russian state and the southern front did not bode well. 
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In early 1918, even as the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaderships 
were trying to secure their own positions politically, economically and mili-
tarily, they still felt the need to try to stick together – for the time being.
Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks were still keen to try to incorporate 
Transcaucasia into their fledgling Soviet state. Although they had been 
comprehensively out-manoeuvred in Georgia by their erstwhile RSDRP 
comrades by the end of 1917, the struggle for control and influence con-
tinued. On 16/29 December, Lenin had appointed Shaumyan ‘provisional 
extraordinary commissar for Caucasus affairs’,32 giving him the Petrograd 
government’s authority over any body, or group of soldiers, which chose to 
recognise it. The local Bolsheviks resisted all measures aimed at developing 
regional non-soviet state institutions. Consequently, they were vehemently 
opposed to the decision, in February 1918, to establish a regional legislature, 
the Transcaucasian Sejm, on the basis of the local Constituent Assembly 
results. Led by Shaumyan, the Bolsheviks organised a mass protest rally 
in Tiflis to coincide with the opening of the Sejm on 10/23 February 1918. 
Fearing that they planned to storm the parliament building and and seize 
power, the Tiflis authorities banned the demonstration. When the crowd 
refused a police order to disperse, Commissariat forces, supported by the 
People’s Guard, opened fire with machine guns. Speaking immediately after 
the event at the Tiflis Soviet, Zhordania claimed that he had been opposed 
to using force, but since the ‘regional authorities had deemed it necessary to 
arrest Shaumyan and Kuznetsov’,33 they had put the People’s Guard at the 
authorities’ disposal. He promised a commission would investigate thor-
oughly, although in his later memoirs he remarked that ‘we knew in advance 
that we would ignore its findings’.34 Shortly afterwards, the Bolshevik party 
was outlawed on Georgian territory. Unable to seize power in a frontal 
assault, and deprived of the chance to agitate openly, the Bolsheviks in 
Georgia went underground and sought to exploit any manifestations of 
unrest or discontent. These were never in short supply, not least among 
Georgia’s national minorities.
Ottoman pressure and Georgian independence
For the first two months of the Sejm’s existence, it continued to claim that 
Transcaucasia had not broken away from Russia, merely it did not recog-
nise the Bolsheviks as Russia’s legitimate rulers. This proved to be a costly 
fiction. From the time of the December ceasefire the Ottomans had been 
trying to nudge Transcaucasia towards declaring independence,35 hoping 
thereby to get a weak buffer state as a neighbour. Clinging to their imaginary 
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status as an integral part of Russia while refusing to recognise Bolshevik 
rule, the Transcaucasians had refused an Ottoman invitation to attend the 
Brest-Litovsk peace conference between the Bolshevik government and the 
Central Powers. Consequently, Lenin’s negotiators reached agreement with 
the Turks regarding the southern front without having to consult the locals. 
In the meantime, in February 1918 the Ottomans had found a pretext to 
break the ceasefire and start advancing across the now scarcely defended 
front line.
While a representative and therefore unwieldy Transcaucasian delegation 
was trying to negotiate with the Ottomans in March and April, it was pre-
sented with new demands that it accept the territorial concessions agreed at 
Brest-Litovsk and evacuate those mainly Armenian areas forthwith. When 
it tried to resist, the Turks advanced. Every new concession by the almost 
defenceless Transcaucasians was met with new demands by the Ottomans. 
To make things worse, the Azerbaijani leaders began to make it clear to 
the Georgians and Armenians that they had no further interest in fighting 
Turkey. They also began to push for Transcaucasia to declare its independ-
ence. 36
On 22 April 1918 the Sejm bowed to the inevitable and announced 
the creation of a ‘Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic’. But 
this unstable and unwanted formation could not withstand the relentless 
Ottoman pressure. Resumed peace talks at Batum in May 1918 found-
ered on the intransigence of the Ottoman delegation, and became instead, 
as Tadeusz Swietochowski out it, ‘a hub of behind-the-scenes maneu-
vring and intrigues’.37 One of the chief intriguers was the Georgian Akaki 
Chkhenkeli, ostensibly there as head of the Transcaucasian government, 
foreign minister and delegation leader. Sensing the futility of his official 
brief, with Armenia almost completely occupied and the Azerbaijani del-
egates at Batum welcoming Ottoman tutelage, Chkhenkeli opted instead 
to exploit the differences between Germany and Turkey on the future of 
Transcaucasia, and to preserve Georgia by cutting a deal with Germany. 
On 22 May he sent a confidential telegram from Batum to the National 
Council of Georgia in Tiflis, outlining his discussions with the German 
representative, General von Lossow. In effect, Chkhenkeli presented a fait 
accompli – he had agreed with von Lossow that Georgia would declare 
independence and immediately request German protection, which would 
be granted in the form of a contingent of German troops. Furthermore, 
in a foretaste of future developments, Chkhenkeli insisted that ‘Georgia’s 
independence shall be declared without listing its borders’, on the grounds 
that if some were listed and others not, that might constitute renunciation 
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of those territories. ‘These matters’, he continued, ‘shall be left to the confi-
dential actions of the Foreign Minister and an agreement with the German 
government’.38 He clearly relished the prospect of independence, ending his 
telegram ‘Who has ever created a state, without taking a risk?’, and citing 
Danton’s celebrated call for ‘audacity, audacity and more audacity still’.39
Some other Georgian social democrats, aware that seceding from 
Transcaucasia was being mooted but generally unaware of the secret diplo-
macy, were less enthusiastic. A discussion article published in the party’s 
Russian-language paper Bor’ba on 26 May, the very day the Sejm voted for 
its own dissolution, argued that a German-backed ‘independent Georgia’ 
would just be something ‘written on a scrap of paper’, that Georgia would 
be seen as ‘acting on the principle “sauve qui peut”’, and that it would create 
‘a deep chasm between the peoples of Transcaucasia’.40 These observations 
were prescient.
Independence declared
The coup de grâce to the Transcaucasian Federation was delivered, with 
characteristic aplomb, by Iraklii Tsereteli at the Sejm’s final session on 26 
May. ‘Does the Transcaucasian Republic still exist?’ he asked rhetorically, 
before addressing the Georgian nation: ‘At this moment you are alone, 
left to your own devices... Know that if you would defend your interests, 
you must create your own state...’.41 With only two dissenting votes, the 
Sejm abolished the Federation and itself. Later that day, in the same build-
ing, Zhordania opened a session of the Georgian National Council. He 
declared that ‘the new state of Georgia which is founded today will never 
act against the interests of any nation, any people, or any state ... no people 
inhabiting our country, or living outside its borders will ever experience 
distress, moral pain or offence at our hands...’.42 The session ended with 
the unanimous adoption of a seven-point declaration of independence. The 
National Council, supplemented with representatives of ethnic minorities, 
was now mandated to function as a Georgian parliament until a Georgian 
Constituent Assembly could be elected and convened, and it was to select 
a provisional government answerable to itself.43 The government, headed 
at first by the social democrat Noe Ramishvili, was a coalition of all the 
main Georgian political forces. The traditional social-democratic objections 
to coalition with non-socialist parties, expressed so forcefully a year previ-
ously, were forgotten.
The country’s long-established German minority seemed to welcome the 
turn of events: its paper Kaukasische Post led with a whimsical celebratory 
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piece ‘Hoch Georgia!!!’ depicting the country as Sleeping Beauty waking 
after being kissed by the (German?) prince.44 The paper was pleased that 
the social democrats had, at long last, come round to the position of the 
other Georgian national parties, abandoning the positions first of a ‘united 
Russian social-democratic front’, then of a ‘Transcaucasian democratic 
front’ to settle finally on a ‘united Georgian democratic front’.45
Such praise may have been embarrassing at first: in a letter to their Russian 
Menshevik comrades on 2 June 1918 the Georgians were almost apologetic 
about their conversion to the cause of independence: ‘We were simply for-
malising a position which had come about against our wishes and in spite of 
our efforts’.46 It was not until mid-July 1918 that they formally constituted 
themselves as a party separate from the RSDRP. But, having finally opted 
for independence, they set about organising it with gusto.
German military occupation limited this ‘independence’ but the occupi-
ers were not much concerned with Georgia’s internal politics. They were 
more interested in trying to exploit its mineral wealth – manganese ore and 
coal. Germany also aspired to gain control of the oilfields of Baku and the 
transportation networks to the Black Sea coast. In their turn, the Georgians 
were hoping for international recognition, protection against Turkey, a 
degree of internal stability and assistance in establishing favourable borders. 
Neither side really got what it wanted. The chaos within Georgia made 
effective exploitation of its resources difficult, although some shipments of 
manganese ore were sent to Germany. Georgia gained temporary recog-
nition from Germany in August, but this was based on a supplement to 
the Brest-Litovsk treaty, repudiated entirely after the fall of the Kaiser in 
November 1918.47 Nonetheless, on balance the Georgian social democrats 
considered their experience of German occupation to have been positive.48 
Land reform was the main measure of social redistribution attempted in 
Georgia in this early phase of independence. The legal basis had been estab-
lished on 20 March 1918 by the Transcaucasian Sejm, but no attempt was 
made to implement it anywhere except Georgia. The reform was scarcely 
socialist, nor was it economically rational – it involved giving small and 
medium peasants legal title to their land, confiscating any large estates and 
selling parcels of land to peasants – but its main aim was ‘to make the peas-
antry the impregnable rampart of the new republican regime’, as Voytinsky 
put it. 49 In this regard, the reform was partially successful, where it could be 
implemented. However, from the outset it met resistance – not only from 
former landowners, but also in places from mistrustful peasants. In summer 
1918 in the ethnically-Georgian Dusheti region the authorities faced a rural 
rising led by pro-Russia peasants who claimed Bolshevik affiliations; this 
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story repeated itself at intervals across Georgia. Only a minority of peas-
ants took part in these risings; overall the mass of the peasants had benefited 
from the land reform.50 But the food situation in the country remained dire 
– independence disrupted long-established trade and other links across the 
border with Russia. The country remained unable to feed itself without 
large-scale grain imports from the North Caucasus.
State-building
The main task of Georgia’s rulers after May 1918 was to build a Georgian 
state, and this both fuelled and made use of an upsurge in national senti-
ment. This mood helped them defend their country’s neutrality in the face of 
German pressure to conclude a military alliance.51 However, it also created 
an atmosphere which many non-Georgians perceived, not always unjustly, 
as rampant Georgian national chauvinism. One campaign was to ‘national-
ise’ the state apparatus – to convert Georgia from a province of the Russian 
empire, administered largely in Russian, into a state with its own national 
language, in which administration, education and so on was conducted in 
Georgian. This programme was pursued energetically from the outset. 
The capital, Tiflis, posed particular problems. It was not really a 
‘Georgian’ city. Under Russian rule it had been a cosmopolitan centre of 
trade and imperial administration, and its largest national group was the 
Armenians – up to 45 percent of the population. Additionally, as many 
Tiflis Armenians were engaged in trade, and owned significant property, 
they had long dominated local politics and the Tiflis city duma. As we shall 
see, by early 1919 the position had changed radically.
Russians made up the second largest group in Tiflis, and many of them 
had been employed in the administration.52 These people were the main 
group likely to be dismissed under the ‘nationalisation’ programme, which, 
as Grigol Uratadze later recalled, somewhat disingenuously, was ‘received 
by a certain part of the Russians living in Georgia with quite unjustified 
hostility’.53 Although the social democrats genuinely tried to involve other 
national groups within Georgia in the country’s political life, there was 
little real enthusiasm among these communities for the project of build-
ing a Georgian nation state. The disaffection of these minorities would be 
exploited by both White and Red forces seeking to reincorporate Georgia 
into the Russian state.
Any regime must try to maintain law and order, and amidst the poverty 
and chaos of war and revolution, this was not straightforward. Crime, 
banditry and mob justice were rife. State institutions were weak and not 
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universally respected. Bolshevik organisations both on the periphery and 
underground in Georgia itself were also active, and local disturbances were 
frequently given a ‘Bolshevik’ colouration through the actions or claims 
of agitators. As both the regular police and army were under-resourced 
and overstretched, the task of maintaining order and security often fell to 
the social democrats’ own paramilitary force, Valiko Dzhugeli’s People’s 
Guard. A kind of cult around this body and its leader was officially fostered. 
The anniversary of its creation, 12 December, became a national holiday. 
Dzhugeli’s highly romanticised diary of his and his comrades’ exploits, as 
they travelled the country putting down rebellions and assisting the army at 
various front lines, was serialised in Bor’ba.54 The People’s Guard, Dzhugeli 
claimed, was ‘fundamentally honest and selfless’, permeated with ‘interna-
tionalism’ and generally expressed ‘human beauty and the magnificence of 
democracy’.55
It is unlikely that the targets of Dzhugeli’s punitive missions saw things 
that way. In relation to one of their early sorties, to repress the peasant 
rebellion in Dusheti, a Bor’ba editorial on 29 June 1918 urged the People’s 
Guard on to ‘merciless retribution against the traitors’, claiming that the 
‘Bolsheviks’ leading the rising were ‘acting hand in glove with agents of 
Black Hundred counterrevolution and Turkish emissaries’.56 Jean Loris-
Melikov, a French-Armenian born in Tiflis, observed of the guard: ‘It is well 
paid, and terrorises the population’.57 ‘Terror’ in Georgia was never a sys-
tematic part of the state-building process, but it was certainly deployed and 
officially enouraged on occasions – particularly against rebellious national 
minorities.
War against Armenia and Armenians
Akaki Chkhenkeli’s refusal to define the state border when independence 
was declared proved to be a recipe for inter-ethnic conflict in peripheral areas. 
Over Georgia’s southern border with Armenia, resentment at Georgia’s 
perceived self-preservation at the expense of Armenia in May 1918 was 
exacerbated by subsequent events. It was reported that 80,000 Armenian 
civilians from the Akhalkalaki region, fleeing before the Turkish advances 
in June 1918, were prevented from entering Georgian-held territory by 
Georgian troops and left to starve in the high mountains. Armenian sources 
estimated that 30,000 of them perished. A few months later, according to 
the same sources, 15,000 newly-arrived refugees were driven back across 
the border to be massacred by Turkish bands.58 There were also territorial 
disputes: in June 1918 Georgia occupied the northern part of the region of 
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Lori, securing the frontier against the Ottomans in this Armenian-majority 
area. Zhordania initially claimed this was a temporary measure, but before 
long Iraklii Tsereteli announced that northern Lori was sovereign Georgian 
territory.59 At the time, pressed by Ottoman forces, Armenia could do little 
about this, but by the autumn of 1918, as Georgia’s protector Germany 
faced defeat, Armenian irregulars, supported by the local population, 
started to fight the Georgians. By mid-December, Georgia and Armenia 
were at war. The conflict lasted two weeks before the new British occupiers, 
who had replaced the Germans, brokered a ceasefire starting at midnight on 
31 December 1918.60 Dzhugeli chronicled his brigade’s last frantic attempts 
to take the (Armenian) village of Bolnis-Khachin before the ceasefire began, 
so that it could ‘present our nation with a splendid New Year’s gift’.61
The war gave new impetus to both Georgian and Armenian national 
chauvinism. In Georgia, as Hovanassian observed, ‘the brunt of the war’ 
was borne by ‘the Armenians of Tiflis and the surrounding communi-
ties’.62 All Armenian civilians in the region were declared to be prisoners 
of war. In January 1919 some were rounded up and were paraded round 
the streets as if they were captured combatants.63 National and class resent-
ment combined in a systematic, semi-official campaign of arrests, looting 
and humiliation of Armenian civilians, particularly the bourgeoisie of 
the capital, whose property was expropriated wholesale in early 1919. 
Although the intense persecution of Armenians soon subsided, the subse-
quent municipal elections in Tiflis were boycotted by most of the Armenian 
and Russian inhabitants, thereby ensuring an ethnic Georgian majority on 
the council for the first time ever.64 The entire inglorious episode had given 
an additional fillip to the ‘nationalisation’ campaign.
Social democrats in power
Crisis management and war necessarily took up a large part of the govern-
ment’s attention and an even bigger part of the state’s resources. Nonetheless, 
a start was made on various modernising reforms. As part of the nation-
alisation process, the network of primary schools was expanded rapidly, 
with education in Georgian. Voytinsky claimed that by 1920 there were 
more than 2000 primary schools in the country, twice the pre-revolutionary 
figure.65 Tiflis University, the first in the Caucasus, was founded in January 
1918. The network of public libraries expanded. There were initiatives in 
adult education, public health, and progressive labour legislation. Some of 
the largest economic assets, notably the mining sector, were either national-
ised or subjected to a state trade monopoly. These sorts of measures helped 
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ensure that, despite the economic ruin and other problems, the social demo-
crats remained genuinely popular – at least among the ethnic Georgians. The 
elections to the Constituent Assembly of Georgia, held in February 1919, 
gave the social democrats a landslide victory. Their party list gained 408,541 
votes, compared with 33,630 for the Socialists-Federalists, 30,128 for the 
National Democrats and 21,453 for the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Of the 
130 seats in the new assembly, the social democrats initially held 109.66 The 
Bolsheviks remained illegal and ineligible to stand, so any sympathy they 
may have had was not recorded. Moreover, as only citizens were eligible 
to vote, national minorities residing in Georgia were probably underrep-
resented, although the social democrats had representatives of all the major 
nationalities on their party list.67 
The assembly did not hurry to perform its primary task and draw up a 
constitution – it only finally adopted one on 21 February 1921, by which 
time Georgia had already been invaded on several fronts by the Red Army 
and the DRG had just days to live.68 Instead, the assembly served from 
March 1919 to February 1921 as the republic’s parliament, to which the gov-
ernment (exclusively social-democratic after March 1919) was answerable.
Georgia’s economic situation was disastrous thoughout the period of 
independence. State finances in particular were catastrophic – in the first 
year of independence total state revenue only covered about a third of state 
expenditure.69 The needs of defence and the transition costs of independ-
ence greatly increased demands on the treasury while tax receipts fell and 
subventions from Russia stopped entirely. Soviet Russia had many similar 
problems, and it is instructive to compare the authorities’ approaches to 
tackling them. Both states resorted to printing money to cover state expend-
iture, and in both cases the result was runaway inflation. However, the task 
of national consolidation pursued by Zhordania’s government meant that it 
did not follow the Bolshevik practice of unleashing internal civil war against 
‘class enemies’ and rely on requisitioning to mobilise resources to anything 
like the same extent as in Russia. The actions against the Tiflis Armenians in 
early 1919 was not part of a broader campaign of forcible expropriation of 
individual property.
One undesirable consequence of the political and economic chaos across 
Transcaucasia was a concentration of people in the big cities, particularly 
Tiflis. Jean Loris-Melikov observed:
As Tiflis fills with Georgians from all parts of the country, the Georgian 
countryside empties [...] Provincial life seems to be dead; production is 
two times lower than it was under the Russian regime.70
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In response to extreme overcrowding and food shortages in Tiflis, in 
November 1919 the government announced draconian measures to expel 
unemployed internal and foreign migrants from the city within two weeks. 
Foreign nationals without business in Tiflis were to leave the republic, 
jobless Georgians were to return to their place of registration. All resi-
dents had to register to prove their right to live there, and any landlords 
or employers who connived at circumventing these measures would them-
selves be expelled.71 Subsequent notices in the press outlined further harsh 
measures against non-compliance. By prioritising the removal of non-
Georgians, the ‘unloading’ of Tiflis in late 1919 could contribute towards 
the city’s ‘nationalisation’.
Conflict on the northern border – Abkhazia, Ossetia and the 
annexation of Sochi
Georgia’s northern border with the Russian North Caucasus was turbulent 
throughout the DRG’s existence. At different times on that border there 
were White armies who hoped to reconquer Transcaucasia, Bolsheviks who 
wanted to Sovietise it, as well as various local armed bands. In September 
1918, in a counteroffensive against Bolshevik forces moving down the Black 
Sea coast, Georgian troops advanced north-westwards through Abkhazia 
and occupied the Russian town of Sochi. Although there were few ethnic 
Georgians in the region, the DRG sent government minister Evgeniy 
Gegechkori there to secure support for a Georgian annexation of the area. 
Although he succeeded in getting resolutions of support from local social-
ists, in the meantime the White armies had arrived there. Gegechkori failed 
to convince the White generals to accept this loss of Russian territory, and 
Georgia had to surrender it.72
Zhordania’s government was generally hostile to General Denikin’s 
White armies. This caused friction during the British occupation in 1919-
1920, since the British were committed to the White side in the civil 
war, and were unsympathetic to Georgia’s pretensions to statehood. In 
early 1919 the Georgians had to bow to British demands and permit the 
transit of a small number of White troops. Bolshevik propagandists, keen 
to denounce the Georgians’ ‘staunch support of all the White Guards’,73 
tried to use this episode as proof, but the documents they provided did not 
make a compelling case.74 For the Georgian social democrats, the Whites 
represented counterrevolution, monarchist reaction and Russian imperial-
ism. Dzhugeli’s diary entries for April 1919, when it looked as though his 
People’s Guard would be fighting Denikin’s forces, showed much more 
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enthusiasm for that fight than for most others.75 At the same time, it was 
necessary to deal and treat with the White administrations across the border 
on a daily basis, both commercially and politically. Fighters in the Russian 
civil war to the north would sometimes seek refuge on Georgian terri-
tory, or try to invade in hot pursuit. One way the Georgians attempted to 
secure part of their northern border in September 1919 was by sponsor-
ing an anti-White rising in Chechnya and Dagestan by the United Mejlis 
of the Mountain-dwelling Peoples of the Caucasus. A prominent Muslim 
Menshevik from Vladikavkaz, Ahmed Tsalikov, produced the newspaper 
of this Mejlis, Vol’nyy gorets [Free Mountain-dweller] on the government 
presses in Tiflis in 1919 and 1920.76 In their own backyard, the Georgians 
were playing power politics.
Besides ethnic Georgians, Armenians and Russians, there were other 
national groups on the territory claimed by Georgia – the Abkhazis on 
the north-west coast around Sukhumi, the Ossetians in the north, and the 
Adjarians in the south west around Batumi. All these groups had differ-
ent political orientations from the Georgians proper; the Abkhazis and 
Ossetians spoke completely different languages, and many Adjarians were 
Muslims. Bolshevism was relatively stronger among the Abkhaz and in 
Batumi.
In the case of Abkhazia, which had voluntarily joined with Georgia in 
June 1918, the DRG made efforts to organise genuine local autonomy for 
the region. However, throughout this period both Bolsheviks and White 
forces were also active in the area. The Whites provided an alternative pole 
of attraction for nervous Abkhazi landowners, while Bolshevik organisers 
fomented peasant discontent over the slow pace of land reform. Abkhazia 
remained restive, but most of the time Georgia’s tussles with Abkhazia were 
political rather than military.77
South Ossetia was a different case – no real autonomy was ever negoti-
ated, and the repression was brutal. A rising was organised there by the 
local Bolsheviks to coincide with the Red Army invasion of Azerbaijan 
in April-May 1920, when they anticipated that the Red forces would then 
sweep through Georgia. Lenin and Stalin attempted to call the rising off, 
but the locals persisted, and by the end of May had declared ‘Soviet power’ 
across South Ossetia.78 Dzhugeli dubbed this episode the ‘South Ossetian 
Vendée’, and insisted ‘these traitors must be punished severely’.79 The main 
tactic of his forces in crushing the rising was to burn down entire villages 
believed to support the rising and drive their inhabitants out into the moun-
tains. He observed, with malicious satisfaction: ‘They will be cold there. 
Very cold!’80 The suppression of the rising was followed by widespread 
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ethnic cleansing, in which all Ossetians who could not positively prove their 
loyalty were driven across the border into North Ossetia, in Russia. This 
ensured enthusiastic Ossetian participation in the Red Army’s overthrow of 
the social-democratic government a few months later, in February 1921.81 
The memory of Georgian brutality in that campaign is kept alive in South 
Ossetia to this day.
International recognition
From the outset DRG’s leaders craved international recognition, which 
they hoped would underpin its separate existence. German recognition in 
1918 had ended after Germany’s defeat, and the British occupation forces 
who replaced the Germans at the end of 1918 backed the Whites’ ambition 
of reconstituting the Russian empire. By 1920 the situation had changed. 
The Whites were heading for defeat, and the British were leaving, finally 
abandoning Batumi in September. The main threat now was Soviet Russia 
to the north. At the end of April the Red Army had invaded and occu-
pied Azerbaijan, mainly to secure the Baku oilfields for Russia. DRG 
forces rebuffed an attempt by the Red Army to press on into Georgia, 
and an attempt at a rising by the Tiflis Bolsheviks on 2 May was crushed 
by the People’s Guard. Soviet Russia, militarily overstretched by its war 
with Poland at that time, decided to postpone its plans to reannex Georgia 
and conclude a treaty instead. On 7 May 1920, unknown to the Tiflis 
Bolsheviks, Grigol Uratadze was in Moscow negotiating a treaty in which 
Russia renounced any claims on Georgia and recognised its independence 
and borders. In a secret clause, the DRG undertook to legalise the activities 
of the Communist Party in Georgia.82
The treaty with Russia was a mixed blessing for the DRG. A large, well-
staffed Russian embassy was established in Tiflis which served as a centre 
for local Bolshevik organisation. At the same time, it became easier for the 
Georgians to monitor the local Bolsheviks and arrest any who attempted to 
overthrow the state. Russian recognition was however a precursor to wider 
recognition by the major European powers in January 1921.
As noted above, Georgia was also keen for recognition by the main 
workers’ parties of Europe, and hosted a high-powered delegation of social-
ist leaders in late 1920, in a mirror image of the burgeoning political tourism 
to Soviet Russia. Karl Kautsky stayed for several months, and there were 
shorter visits from other leaders, including Ramsay MacDonald in October. 
Their reports were all most enthusiastic. MacDonald told the Manchester 
Guardian that
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Georgia is a most productive country. Its wine is of a very high quality. 
The country is prosperous on the whole, and there is plenty to eat.83
He also assured his readers that there was ‘complete liberty of opinion’, and 
that ‘Bolshevik propaganda [...] is not interfered with’.84
Kautsky wrote a detailed pamphlet: Georgia. A Social-Democratic 
Peasant Republic (1921), which, just like foreign admirers’ accounts of visits 
to Soviet Russia of the time, almost completely failed to find any faults with 
his hosts. He paid almost no attention to the national question, or to any 
of the repressive measures to which the DRG government had resorted at 
different times. Overall, Kautsky’s presentation of the DRG as a social-
democratic success story and ‘the antithesis to Bolshevism’,85 had more to 
do with his struggle against the communists in Germany than with the reali-
ties of life in Georgia. 
However, Kautsky was quite right to point out that the revolt which 
precipitated the Red Army invasion in February 1921 was not a rising of 
the Tiflis proletariat, which remained generally loyal to the government, 
but of ‘remote villages’.86 The Bolsheviks had failed to foment a genuine 
workers’ rising to which the Red Army could provide ‘fraternal assistance’, 
so they had to make do with a peasant revolt. It was a bitter irony that the 
area which revolted on 11 February 1921 was the Armenian-majority Lori 
district, which Georgia had annexed and fought to retain in the summer 
of 1918. Armenia, which had been taken over by Soviet Russia just weeks 
before, at the end of November 1920 in a carve-up with Turkey, now served 
as a bridgehead in an invasion which in five weeks had reconquered Georgia 
for Russia. The consolidation of the Georgian nation would continue over 
the next seven decades, but within the framework of the Georgian Soviet 
Socialist Republic.
Democratic socialism – or nation-building?
Georgia’s social-democratic leaders were serious Marxists who understood 
socialist internationalism very well. But the character of a regime is not 
determined by the good intentions of its leaders alone. The DRG was con-
structed, in the face of ongoing internal and external hostility, by thousands 
of ordinary Georgians who cared little for the niceties of social democracy 
but were keen to build, serve and defend a Georgian national state. In this 
situation, it is scarcely surprising that many observers noticed an atmos-
phere of national chauvinism pervading independent Georgia. One of the 
most scathing, the British journalist C. E. Bechhofer, who was there in late 
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1919, denounced it as ‘a classic example of an imperialist “small nation”’, 
adding that ‘in territory-snatching outside and bureaucratic tyranny inside, 
its chauvinism was beyond all bounds’.87 Jean Loris-Melikov remarked on 
petty acts like the removal of all signage in Russian or Armenian in Tiflis,88 
and even Ramsay MacDonald noted that ‘the Georgians are intensely anti-
Bolshevik and also anti-Russian’.89 As for the Armenian Mikael Varandian, 
his bitter verdict was that ‘in theory, Georgian social democracy has always 
professed the purest internationalism, but in reality, it has followed crudely 
nationalist policies’.90
Could it have been otherwise? It had never been the intention of the 
Georgian social democrats to lead an independence movement. But it is 
easy to see how circumstances, their own commitment to democracy, and 
their willingness to shoulder their responsibilities as elected representa-
tives of their nation led them into that position. Unfortunately, in many 
respects they were thereby, as Loris-Melikov observed at the time, ‘van-
quished by the nationalism of the petty bourgeoisie’.91 It was not evil intent 
but the logic of their situation which led them into secret diplomacy with 
Imperial Germany and Turkey at the expense of the Armenians, border 
wars with their neighbours over slivers of territory, and conflict with their 
own national minorities – all of which fostered the sort of chauvinism 
that the social democrats had struggled against for most of their political 
lives. The task of building a nation state amidst war, ruin and ethnic strife 
has a logic of its own – one which is difficult to combine with proletarian 
internationalism. 
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